Both barn dancing and the Beatles are not as popular as well; for heaven’s sake, some people don’t even know who Gerry and the Pacemakers were! And who was Chuck Berry? Or Hank Snow? Them was the good old days, sang Roger Miller.

Organizational development was once widely practiced, embraced by both universities who churned out young consultants like pancakes at a breakfast dirty spoon joint; clientele included government agencies, armies, family businesses and high tech. OD became a fad, like sideburns, short skirts, fedora hats and Blackberry phones. That era is dead, מת, caduc.

Nowadays, there is less OD done than in the past. Part of the decline I have explained in another widely read post; in this post I want to focus more on factors endogenic to OD, ie, factors which are not explained away by external constraints facing the profession, but rather come from within.

• OD is both an art and a science. Clients who want a science-based intervention and practitioner generally need the more artistic type intervention and the opposite. But clients buy what they want, not what they need. And too few OD practitioners can offer both types with the same quality of intervention.

• OD is not suitable for all organizations. OD’s impact cannot be quantitatively measured, its impacts are obtuse, and other forms of change such as re-orgs, firing under-performers and coaching are more user appealing, because they have more “apparent” effectiveness. Ie, they look good, they smell good and they impress owners and board members much more than OD. For Christ’s sake, what is OD?

• There are many OD professionals out there, with far more providers than clients. Very few OD professionals are on top of their game, rather there are many one trick ponies such as trainers, team builders, AI freaks, or high priests of some new religious fad sweeping the profession such as rebranding strategies for individual employees. There are also many incompetent people who have done a lot of damage by peddling damaged goods such as one -size-fits-all nonsense; see next item.

• Clients that do well with OD are very unique, the exception rather than the rule: they are truly dedicated to long term sustainable albeit intangible improvement; they value effectiveness much more than the current pop star, apparent effectiveness and gloss. Commercialized OD, meaning pre-packaged so-called axiomatic nonsense, is pure gloss- as well as pure nonsense. Organizations are very complex webs of human interaction, often extremely difficult to decipher.

• There are too few examples of OD projects that are hugely successful enough to serve as a positive reference point, to encourage potential clients to jump into the pool. I have been in the profession for over 45 years, and while I have an excellent track record and very satisfied clients on all continents except South America, my happy client list cannot be compared to that of a dental surgeon or plastic surgeon. Few clients are willing to share intimate details about how OD made a real difference. I had a very satisfied client (who retired) who said, “I never understood what you did until you stopped doing it (because of a downturn in his market).

The organization is facing declining sales and profitability, and senior management has mandated significant cost reductions. Paul Wight, Head of R&D based in Denver, leads several development sites located in Brunswick (New Jersey), Vancouver (BC), Québec City, and Manchester (UK). He has been instructed to downsize his organization by 30% and close one of the sites. To discuss this plan, Paul calls all site managers to Denver.

The most controversial decision is determining which location will be closed. The head of the Manchester site, Chester Man, deeply mistrusts Paul’s judgment. Chester believes Paul dislikes the time zone challenges, the early and late hours of conference calls, and the travel burdens of flying to Manchester quarterly—in coach class. Chester suspects Paul has a hidden agenda to shut down Manchester.

Similarly, Denise Thibadeau, who leads the Québec site, assumes that her location is at risk. She believes the Québec site will be closed because of communication challenges—specifically hard to understand accents—as well as additional costs tied to compliance with Canadian language laws. Although development costs are subsidized by provincial tax concessions, Paul often shows impatience on calls when he cannot immediately understand what is being said. Denise interprets this as further evidence of bias.

In recent weeks, Denise and Chester, despite their personal animosity, have started discussing how to counter Paul’s perceived plan. They form a tactical alliance, agreeing to jointly take responsibility for maintaining a profitable legacy product and developing a new platform at exceptional speed and minimal cost. They knowingly misrepresent the timeline, assuming they can “clean it up later.” Their strategy is to leverage their sites’ low employee turnover; they escalate their proposal directly to Paul’s boss — a European — hoping to neutralize Paul’s influence.

Meanwhile, Paul asks his HR manager, Gloria Ramsbottom, to create an activity to build trust for the Denver meeting. She prepares a cooking class, followed by a webinar of a horse that runs increasingly fast while eating less.

Ultimately, Paul shuts down the Vancouver site. Denise and Chester grow their sites by 20%. Within months, Paul “moves on to his next assignment,” and Denise is selected to replace him starting in March.

Summary

This case illustrates the political dynamics and infighting within a geographically dispersed organization facing downsizing. Paul, the R&D head, must close one site and reduce staff by 30%. Site leaders in Manchester and Québec—fearing targeted closure based on assumed biases—form an unlikely alliance to protect their locations. They manipulate strategic commitments and leverage internal politics to override Paul’s authority. Despite attempts to build trust, the meeting fails to resolve underlying tensions. In the end, the Vancouver site is closed, the coalition succeeds, and Denise replaces Paul. The case highlights the challenges of mistrust, perceived favoritism, cultural differences, and coalition-building during organizational restructuring.

PS Lesson learned: People will never reach agreement who is the unlucky one to get a second circumcisions if they themselves are candidates for this procedure. Don’t use teams when you need to decide on your own.

Most societies have quirks. In Uganda, everything moves at a snail’s pace, so the easiest task can take days on end. Recently it took me 3 months to dry clean a hat.

In Thailand, people will tell you anything that will keep you feeling happy, even if it’s not true at all. Klenjaing someone  may express itself as refusing help or faking happiness to avoid  “losing face” or causing someone else to lose face.

And in Japan, everything can appear as one big quirk. Especially dating dolls, or not particularly enthused about sex.

Denmark’s many quirks did not amaze me.

Ok, mothers put kids outside to sleep in the winter (unsupervised in strollers) because it is healthy. At the royal palace, there are almost no policemen. Toilets often have music playing and are beautifully  “designed to calm”. One can ride the train without a turnstile on either end. And everything works well+.

All this is fascinating but it is not what amazed me.

What did and still does rattle me is how much deep thought was unleashed by my trip to Denmark .

My mind has been overwhelmed with questions since I returned home vis a vis the question “what makes Denmark such a success?”

1. What is the role of wealth vrs homogeneity in the establishment and maintaining  of a successful and flourishing society? (Denmark is a very homogenous society. Ethnic Danes make up about 86 +% of the population of Denmark. There are approximately another 15.5  thousand Norwegians as well as  15 thousand Swedes. Immigration is severely restricted.)
2. What has gone wrong in so many countries whereby  people no longer trust their government? (Danes trust their government)
3. In order to drive compromise between polarities, what needs to change? Could it be that in too diverse a society, this is impossible? (Danes share a consciousness of kind which means that compromise which will hold us together)
4. Does being left of centre mean being tolerant of every excess? Does being right of centre mean you lean towards fascism? Maybe left and right mean nothing anymore. (In Denmark, everyone is left of centre, and a bit right of centre)
5. What can societies do to remain human and highly digitalized at the same time? (Denmark is both)

In many ways, Denmark is a miracle;  a veritable  pearl of a country.

What have they done right (or who are they) so as to differentiate themselves from a world which is slowly descending into a pit of horrendous dysfunction? THAT is something to think about.

One cannot come away from Denmark without thinking that many basic assumptions we have about society and politics need serious re-examination.

The Danes (1) are, or (2) are doing, something very very much better than all of us. Maybe one, maybe both.

+ Almost everything. The signage in the Copenhagen Metro is very confusing, and we headed in the wrong direction several times. The ticket machines for the metro are frustrating to say the least. We often just gave up, travelled gratis and prepared our excuses.

In 2009, I passed by a pet shop, saw him in the window, and came out with shop with him in my arms. No planning was involved. Love at first sight it was. Pure infatuation.

George lived the “life of Riley”. He got many chunks of food from the table directly from my plate in addition to his first class dog food. He also ate the best of treats.

We had many long walks on the beaches of Eilat and Tel Aviv. He got his own beach chair in which he lounged, switching from time to time to in his chair, under his chair, or on my stomach. At the beach in Eilat, they knew me and offered me two chairs, “one for George”, when I arrived.

When he was younger, he would join me on my 10 km runs. We played Frisbee for hours and when a Frisbee got caught in a tree, we immediately got a brand new one, returning to play the next day. He got us into trouble several times. On one of his walks with me on the beach in Herzelia, he swallowed a fishing hook, which had to be extricated in an operation that afternoon. George and another dog once traded snarls and George’s opponent took a mighty piece out of my leg which took 2 months to heal. And to boot, George went head to head with a local canine bully, and lost! Several stiches and panic galore.

George was the very best of friends and my love for him will always be abounding. We spent 16 years and 4 months together. The time I spent with George was a welcome exhilarating topping to my life.

The last few months George was not himself. He developed canine dementia, sore legs, poor eyesight if any, no hearing, and had trouble standing up.

Georgie, I am so sorry I did not act earlier. The biggest gap is not between life and death, but life and a good life.

George led a very long and happy life.

I held him in my arms, and said, “toda yeled”…thank you boy.

Then Dr Yuval did what he had to do-and now I need to forget his last moments so that the memory of our loving friendship  will be with me as long as I am around.

On the poem by Lord Byron https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/So,_we%27ll_go_no_more_a_roving

Internal OD/Training people are dealt a poor deck of cards at the start of their career.

Their boss, the HR manager, holds little power when compared to peers, be it Marketing, Finance or Sales.

These new internals are generally younger, female and have never managed anything of any complexity.

And let’s face it, most of the time, people do NOT trust HR people.

I have trained generations of people in this position; here is the essence of the focus that I suggest.

1. Avoid over (any) involvement in the “Performance Appraisal” ritual process. Of course, it’s not possible to totally circumvent some role, like skill training. But make sure not to be High Priest of this religion.
2. Pay close attention to problematic interfaces, and not under performing people. Interfaces (sales and presales) (Finance and Purchasing) that suddenly start to creak less provide you with lots of exposure.
3. Do not serve company cool aid. Stay away from the sacraments of the company’s values, mission statements and other verbiage. Focus on what does not work-not on peddling sublime verbiage.
4. Make your HR manager part of YOUR client system.  (Example, streamline the recruiting process) If the HR manager is not your client, buy a shovel and dig a hole.
5. Hire very skilled consultants to do important work, not the cronies you studied with at community college. A very skilled consultant will not only do good work, but also help you get better jobs as your career develops. Your HR manager will not generally do that.
6. Talk to people; do not interview them. Stand next to people as they do their job and have them explain it to you. Do not sit and hide behind your laptop.

After an acquisition, the bean counters step aside and the value they hoped to create often starts falling apart.

There are many possible reasons for that; in this post I want to address one salient reason: the middle managers of the acquiring company start to bully and mess around with the middle management of the acquired company.

• Example from VP of marketing to VP of Marketing in acquired company: the presales material is not up to our standards; please submit all future material for review before posting on web site.
• Or take this example from Head of Travel to Travel Coordinator of acquired site:  your employees must fly out the same night that work ends, this being the case until 23.00 at night. The airline of choice is the cheapest airline available. All ticket purchases to be done 8 days in advance.

And I could go on and on.

Why does this bullying occur? Clearly some of it is merely clarifying lose ends left over from the acquisition. But that’s the least of it.

For the middle management of the acquiring company, an acquisition is often a pain in the ass: working at strange hours (getting up at 6 am to speak to an Australian); or listening to hard to understand accents (Thai, Japanese, Chinese). The middle management of the acquiring firm may need to manage arguing Israelis, Taiwanese or Dutch, passive aggressive Indonesians, or “apparently obedient” Thais. Often the middle management of the acquiring company need to make a power grab to insure their own job security, lest they lose their jobs to better skilled counterparts. And often-it’s just a pissing contest.

But worst of all, there is a mindset of “I acquired you” so “do what I tell you”, as if the middle manager has acquired the asses with his own “stifa” (Hebrew slang for wad of money).

So, what is to be done?

That, dear readers, is another post.

התעמרות במנהלים בדרג הביניים אחרי רכישות (או מיזוגים)

אחרי רכישה, רואי החשבון מפנים את הבמה — ומהר מאוד הערך שכולם קיוו ליצור מתחיל להתפורר.
יש הרבה סיבות לזה, אבל כאן אני רוצה להתמקד באחת מהבולטות שבהן: מנהלי הביניים של החברה הרוכשת מתחילים להתעמר, או פשוט “לשגע”, את מנהלי הביניים של החברה שנרכשה.
כמה דוגמאות מהשטח:
סמנכ״ל שיווק של החברה הרוכשת לסמנכ״ל שיווק של החברה הנרכשת:
“החומרים השיווקיים שלכם לא עומדים בסטנדרטים שלנו. מעכשיו כל חומר עתידי צריך לעבור אישור לפני שמפרסמים אותו באתר.”
ראש תחום נסיעות לרכזת נסיעות של האתר שנרכש:
“העובדים שלכם צריכים לטוס הביתה באותו לילה שבו מסתיימת העבודה — גם אם זה עד 23:00 בלילה. נטוס רק עם חברת התעופה הזולה ביותר, והכרטיסים יוזמנו שמונה ימים מראש.”
והרשימה עוד ארוכה.
למה זה קורה בכלל?
חלק מזה הוא באמת צורך לסגור פינות שנשארו פתוחות אחרי הרכישה — אבל רוב זה לא שם.
עבור מנהלי הביניים של החברה הרוכשת, רכישה היא לרוב כאב ראש אחד גדול:
פתאום צריך לעבוד בשעות משונות (למשל לקום ב־6 בבוקר כדי לדבר עם אוסטרליה),
או להבין מבטאים קשים (תאילנדים, יפנים, סינים).
לפעמים צריך להתמודד עם ישראלים, טאיוואנים או הולנדים ישירים מדי, עם אינדונזים פסיביים־אגרסיביים, או עם תאילנדים שנראים צייתנים — עד שהם לא.
בנוסף, יש גם פחד: מנהלי הביניים של החברה הרוכשת חוששים לאבד את המשרה שלהם לעמיתים מוכשרים יותר מהחברה הנרכשת, ולכן הם מנסים “להראות מי הבוס” כדי לבסס שליטה.
ולפעמים, אם נהיה כנים — זה פשוט קרב אגו אחד גדול.
אבל הגרוע מכל הוא הלך הרוח של “אני זה שרכש אותך, אז אתה תעשה מה שאני אומר”, כאילו אותו מנהל ביניים קנה את האנשים בעצמו, עם הסטיפה שלו.
אז מה עושים עם זה?
זה כבר נושא לפוסט הבא

I’ve had the privilege of working on both human due diligence before acquisitions and post-merger integration projects. Here’s what I’ve learned along the way—headlines only, because each is a world unto itself:

• Set reasonable expectations for integration.. At best, acquisitions (aka mergers) are akin to a bad case in indigestion.

• During due diligence, you learn less than 30% of what you’re actually acquiring.

• Every company has a reason it’s being sold—and you might not know it until after the deal closes.

• Talk to executives who have left the target company; they often tell a very different  story than those who are still in the target company.

• Financial and marketing analysis alone? Not enough.

• Let’s call it what it is: an acquisition, not a merger.

• Weak links in your own company will haunt you later—a weak IT department becomes a post-acquisition nightmare.

• Decide fast. Poor decisions can be reversed; dithering is deadly.

• Trust and transparency are non-negotiable for success.

• Expect some lying during due diligence—and forgive once the deal is done.

• Face-to-face communication trumps Zoom every time. Get to know each other in person over the first 2–3 years.

• Post acquisition integration is often severely hampered by the middle management of the acquiring company bullying the acquired company’s middle management. Establish ground rules to prevent this.

• When purchasing a “client base” of a company, you’d better retain those people who manage the relationships with this client base.

Acquisitions are messy, human, and unpredictable. But the more you focus on people, speed, and trust, the smoother the journey becomes..

Remote and virtual teams are now a core feature of how many organizations operate. While they bring clear advantages — such as access to global talent and around-the-clock operations — they also face recurring structural and cultural challenges.
These challenges, often rooted in trust deficits, can limit collaboration, reduce efficiency, and weaken overall performance. This paper outlines three of the most common trust barriers and explores their impact on distributed team effectiveness.

1. Hidden Agendas and Power Imbalances

A frequent source of tension in remote teams involves control — specifically, who sets direction, which site plays the strategic role, and how influence is distributed across locations.

Over time, the sites perceived as more influential often secure the most strategic work, larger budgets, and stronger support from senior leadership. This creates a cycle where those sites grow in importance while others risk being marginalized, assigned only low-visibility or maintenance tasks.

Unchecked, these dynamics can lead to disengagement, reduced morale, and eventual downsizing of less favored sites. Addressing this requires deliberate governance structures, transparent decision-making processes, and an explicit commitment to equitable distribution of strategic responsibilities.

2. Limited Transparency Across Sites

Information sharing patterns in virtual teams frequently reveal a form of “local loyalty.” Teams tend to communicate openly within their own location but are less transparent across geographical boundaries.

This behavior often stems from a perception that information is a source of power. In some cases, teams may even view transparency as a weakness in the competitive dynamic between sites.
The result is siloed knowledge, duplication of effort, and missed opportunities for synergy.

Establishing cross-site transparency requires both structural and cultural interventions. Clear communication protocols, shared platforms, and leadership expectations around openness all help build trust and improve collaboration across locations.

3. Tension Between Differing Competencies

Remote teams are often distributed in ways that reflect different strengths and priorities. For example:

• U.S.-based sites may focus on market alignment.

• Israeli sites often emphasize innovation.

• Indian sites are known for flexibility and scalability.

• Japanese sites frequently specialize in deep customer intimacy.

While these competencies are valuable, they can also generate friction when priorities diverge. For instance, a site focused on fulfilling specific client requests may conflict with another emphasizing product roadmap consistency.

Addressing this tension requires intentional alignment around shared objectives. Leadership must ensure that each site’s strengths are recognized and leveraged in a complementary way, rather than allowed to become sources of division.

Conclusion

Improving individual performance within virtual teams is important, but it is insufficient if the broader organizational environment undermines trust. The challenges outlined above — hidden control agendas, limited transparency, and competing competencies — are systemic issues that require systemic solutions.

By addressing these trust barriers directly, organizations can transform remote and virtual teams from loosely connected groups into cohesive, high-performing units capable of sustained collaboration and innovation.

The Overuse of the Term “Trust”

The term trust has become so overused and broadly interpreted that it often loses its significance, particularly within the context of the global workplace. Because it means different things to different people, the concept of trust is frequently too vague to be useful in facilitating effective collaboration and mutual understanding.

Consider the following example that illustrates differing cultural perspectives. In many German professional environments, trust is closely associated with adherence to established processes. The prevailing logic is: “If you follow the process, I will trust you; once I trust you, I will follow the process.” This reflects a deeply procedural understanding of trust.

A contrasting example can be seen in interactions between Chinese and American business professionals. Imagine a scenario in which Mr. Wu and Mr. Smith sign a $40 million agreement. Subsequently, Mr. Wu asks Mr. Smith to employ his son for one year to enable him to obtain a U.S. visa. Mr. Smith interprets this request as unethical and, consequently, loses trust in Mr. Wu. Mr. Wu, on the other hand, feels that he extended a favor and now perceives Mr. Smith as untrustworthy for refusing to reciprocate. Both parties use the same term—trust—but with entirely different expectations and interpretations.

This illustrates how trust, much like other overused terms such as respect (a topic I have addressed in a previous post), can lose its meaning and practical value in intercultural and organizational contexts.

Through my years of consulting with thousands of professionals who have successfully built trusting relationships, I have developed ten principles that operationalize what trust truly means in practice. Three of these principles are shared below:

1. We accurately represent each other’s views when the other party is not present.

2. We follow through on the decisions we make together.

3. We assume positive intent in each other’s actions.

After a merger or acquisition, leaders often talk about “blending the best of both cultures.” It sounds ideal—but it’s not how culture really works.

In practice, culture doesn’t merge. It competes. One culture dominates—usually the acquirer’s—and the other adapts or fades. While this can feel Darwinian, it’s not necessarily negative. Integration needs clarity, consistency, and ultimately one cultural backbone.

That said, the acquired company can leave its mark. Over time, fragments of its values or practices may influence the larger whole. But always within the framework of the stronger culture.

So, where should leaders focus in the first year after a deal closes? Three things matter most:

1. Scalability: Capturing value from the deal requires scale. This need drives real cultural and operational change.

2. Power Structure: Build a loyal leadership group inside the acquired company. Resistance and clinging to autonomy slow down integration.

3. Mourning: Acknowledge that employees in the acquired company go through a grieving process. True integration happens when individuals, not groups, embrace the new identity.

For consultants, the lesson is clear: your role isn’t to engineer a “perfect cultural blend.” It’s to guide the natural process, like a midwife—helping transition with as little pain as possible.

Yes, there will always be glossy “culture-merging frameworks” on the market that promise quick fixes. But culture doesn’t integrate in three easy steps. It evolves—through alignment, leadership, and time.