Consulting to Over-Committed Organizations: Why They Crash, Why They Thrive, and What Consultants Must Do

Consulting to Over-Committed Organizations: Anatomy of Failure, Survival, and Intervention

Organizations frequently commit to delivering products, features, or projects far beyond their actual capacity. Sometimes this happens because the client demands it, sometimes because executives need a win, and sometimes because the market or political environment forces an impossible timeline. Yet many of these same organizations remain profitable and even admired—at least for a while—despite chronic over-promising and chronic under-delivery.

This article weaves together several cases, cultural contrasts, and field observations to explain why over-commitment happens, how to recognize early warning signs, and what OD consultants can realistically do to help cope.

It concludes with a framework for engaging organizations that set very, very aggressive goals.


1. A Commitment That Never Had a Chance

A major client was promised a fully functioning, installed, ready-to-use product by Nov 4th. A confident, decisive commitment was made.

What actually happened?

  • The product arrived in May of the following year.

  • It had not been fully tested.

  • 60% of revenue-generating features were still “in the pipeline.”

  • The client threatened litigation.

  • The vendor accused the client of “misrepresenting site readiness and employee skill.”

Anyone who truly understood the organization would not have been surprised.
The collapse was scribbled on the wall from day one. No one even believed that the promises made could be kept. Not one person.


2. The Scribbling on the Wall: Early Warning Signs of Over-Commitment

Five classic indicators predict the kind of disaster described above:

1. The client “over-buys.”

They demand the impossible from the vendor because they are under existential pressure (“increase market share by 30% or you’re out of a job”).

2. Leadership forces an aggressive commitment onto developers.

High-confidence, low-technical-depth optimists take control; critics and realists are sidelined.

3. Employees agree—but conditionally and unrealistically.

“When QA finishes… when Silvan delivers… once real-time is ready… we can probably make it.” There is lots of “apparent agreement”, but no actual agreement.

4. Risks are verbally massaged away.

Documentation evaporates, status reports become cryptic, and management relies on upbeat verbal tap-dancing which, over time, becomes a dialect of ambiguity and obfuscation.

5. More people are thrown at the effort as the skilled ones exit.

Headcount rises; competence falls. Institutional memory collapses.

Even if you foresee all this, you often cannot stop it. The business cycle rewards short-term promises—even insane ones. Everyone makes money during the climb, and the crash is treated as “circumstantial.”  As Israel Fruman has pointed out in private correspondence, some organizations/cultures incent short-term goals (quarterly/annual goals). The executives who the un-realistic goals are being rewarded (salary promotions, bonuses, equity value).When the truth emerges, they may already left the organization anymore and in any case no one will collect all of the incentives they have been rewarded.


3. Cultural Contrasts: How Different Leaders Respond to Impossible Commitments

Culture needs to be factored into the overly aggressive commitment process. For example:

A utility company in Asia requests a mobile app that measures household air pollution and sends the data to a central authority. They demand deployment in six months, timed for a high-profile visit by a Provincial Premier.

Two vendors respond. Fred and Gal.


Fred (United States): Transparency and Control

Fred, CEO of Freddy and Sons, spends 400 hours analyzing contingencies.
His conclusion: best-case scenario is 3 months late.

Fred prepares a detailed plan and meets the customer to renegotiate timeline or scope. He prioritizes:

  • long-term reputation,

  • honest expectations,

  • prevention of surprises,

  • transparency as a principle.

Fred’s assumptions:

  • Customers must be satisfied, not managed.

  • Plans create control.

  • Transparency pays off.

  • The long term matters more than the short term.


Gal (Tel Aviv): “We Can Do It”—Improvisation and Relationship Management

Gal, CEO of Gal and Sons, meets the client and immediately says:
“We can do it. We can start tomorrow.”

Gal assumes:

  • The customer knows they’re over-buying.

  • The customer knows he is over-selling.

  • A crisis-time improvisation later will make everyone look good.

  • Close personal relationships will buffer failure.

  • A few pyrotechnic demonstrations during the Premier’s visit will satisfy political needs.

Gal’s assumptions:

  • Customers must be managed, not informed.

  • Transparency may hinder survival.

  • Plans are constraints.

  • Short-term wins matter more than long-term consequences.

Both approaches can work—and both can fail—depending on the culture of the client, politics, and lady luck.


4. When Transparency Isn’t the Problem: Global Teams in Meltdown

A multinational product is rumored to be eight months behind schedule, triggering panic at corporate HQ. An external inexperienced consulting firm (dealing in DEI, extricating organizational pathology via coaching, and organizational sustainability)  is hired.

Their diagnosis:
“Not enough transparency between teams in San Francisco, Tel Aviv, and Beijing.”

The truth:

  • The real delay is two years, not eight months.

  • SF developers are uploading résumés and blaming Israelis for missing architecture.

  • Israelis claim SF’s requirements are “empty platitudes.”

  • Beijing developers write reports about nonexistent modules while spending their days on Facebook.

  • Everyone is maneuvering to avoid being blamed for commitments that were hallucinatory from the start.

The external consultant misses the root issue entirely because he relies on a productized OD model and has never worked outside the US.

This is common: consultants focus on symptoms (communication breakdowns) rather than the cause (over-commitment driving political warfare).


5. What Are “Very, Very Aggressive Goals”?

A very, very aggressive goal requires:

  • prolonged hard work, weekend after weekend, holiday after holiday

  •  quality constraints (which make do-ability absurd in a fast and dirty mode)

  • no rework

  • and usually some degree of luck.

These goals often cannot be met without slippage—schedule, budget, or scope.

Why organizations set them:

  1. Demanding clients force this to happen
    (“Upgrade your product or we will uninstall it.”)

  2. Political career-building.
    (A colonel wants a victory before promotion.)

  3. Survival crises.
    (A competitor emerges, or a pandemic requires a life-saving drug.)

  4. Rapid strategic advantage.
    (Cybersecurity demands in high-threat environments.)


6. Impact on Employees, Managers, and Consultants

Employees

New employees see aggressive goals as a platform to shine quickly.

Veterans don protective armor:

  • conditional commitments,

  • carefully crafted excuses,

  • strategic disengagement,

  • a refusal to “start working hard too early.”

As Dr. Joseph George notes, sustainable achievement requires psychological safety—something aggressive-goal environments erode quickly.

Employees eventually stop believing in truth.
Facts die first.


Managers

Middle managers are trapped. They must:

  • protect employees, yet

  • appear aligned with senior leadership.

They become translators between fantasy and reality. The fantasy is way way up in the clouds, and the reality can cold, bitter and overwhelming.

Senior managers initially crack the whip, ignore constraints, show disdain for caution, and listen only to optimism. Eventually they rewrite the story:

  • “Circumstances changed.”

  • “The market shifted.”

  • “The troops were incompetent.”

  • or they reorganize to buy more time.

Failure is reframed—not acknowledged.


Consultants

Consulting in these environments is extremely delicate.

Common pitfalls:

  • becoming a pressure-amplifier for management,

  • losing the trust of first-line employees (“the Dilberts”),

  • believing opportunistic heroes “stepping up to save the day,”

  • trying to impose textbook transparency models that do not fit reality.


7. How to Consult to Over-Committed Organizations

The key is understanding how the organization will eventually de-commit.

Goffman calls this “cooling the mark.”
It happens in predictable stages:

  1. “We can do it!”

  2. “We’re doing our best.”

  3. “A few difficulties, but we’re confident.”

  4. “Some features need improvement.”

  5. “We will do phased delivery.”

  6. “We have a crisis.”

  7. Renegotiation.

Your role is not to prevent de-commitment—it cannot be prevented.
Your role is to help it happen with the least political damage and loss of trust.

Three proven interventions

1. Find where commitments are really made.

Formal project plans are often meaningless.
Identify the informal power centers and work with them—plus a few developers from the trenches.

2. Create a “no surprises” pact.

Both management and staff eventually crave this. It reduces lying and opens space for reality.

3. Foster peer commitments, not upward commitments.

Employees lie to managers easily.
They lie to peers much less.
Peer-to-peer commitments reveal the truth.

Additional consulting principles

  • Maintain full trust with programmers—the moment they see you as an enforcer, they begin lying to you as well.

  • Avoid quick-fix heroes; they often seek PR wins, not solutions.

  • Use early, intentionally partial interventions (team-building, coaching) to soften leadership before the real bad news is revealed.

  • Accept that some things cannot be fixed until the crash is undeniable.


8. Five Things You May Not Know About Very Aggressive Commitments

  1. Culture matters.
    Risk-tolerant cultures embrace aggressive commitments more easily.

  2. Sometimes these commitments succeed.
    Especially when luck, timing, and politics align.

  3. Truth dies first.
    In organizations built on aggressive goals, no one knows what is truly doable.

  4. Some very successful organizations consistently over-commit and under-deliver.
    Real life is not an OD textbook.

  5. Aggressive goals create short-term innovation.
    Shortcuts, risk-taking, and creative hacks flourish—temporarily.


Conclusion

Over-committed organizations are not rare—they are the norm. They can function, even thrive, for long periods despite unrealistic commitments. But these commitments distort culture, erode truth, and produce systemic political behavior.

For consultants, the challenge is not to “fix” over-commitment.
It is to navigate it—managing the slow, painful shift from fantasy to reality while helping both leaders and employees remain functional, honest, and aligned enough to survive the collapse.

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Can Highly Successful Organizations Still Do Most Things Wrong?

I would like to present two brief case studies and then offer several conclusions.

Case Study 1: Save-Save

Save-Save is a device that claims to reduce consumers’ electricity bills by up to 40%. Founded by the eccentric entrepreneur Keith P., the company treats many of its employees as interchangeable parts. Turnover—particularly in administrative and customer-service roles—approaches 60% annually. Keith personally makes nearly all major decisions. While his marketing instincts and technical judgment have proven remarkably accurate, his staffing and organizational capabilities are notably weak. Despite this, Save-Save has extraordinary projected revenue for the coming years, and both Keith and his investors have generated substantial financial returns.

Case Study 2: Sally-Re

Sally-Re prepares salary slips for the Ministry of Education’s 15,000 employees. The company has held this contract since 1951, when it was founded by Sally’s grandfather, who was dismissed from the Ministry for a “behavioral impropriety” involving his secretary but was also a major donor to the governing political party (which remains in power). Sally-Re employs approximately 300 people, many of whom are family members or lack basic computer literacy. The company outsources nearly all of its core functions, including data security. Nevertheless, Sally-Re has continued to generate significant financial benefit throughout its history.

These cases illustrate that some organizations thrive because they possess an irresistible product, enjoy extraordinary luck, or have advantageous political connections. Their success persists regardless of internal dysfunction.
Conversely, organizations led by capable managers with sound strategies and solid products can still fail.

For OD practitioners, failing to recognize these underlying dynamics can lead to focusing on the wrong issues, being selected for the wrong reasons, or misunderstanding the organization’s “genetic code.” The risks are considerable and may ultimately harm professional credibility.

As a final note, Sally-Re has recently been instructed by the government to improve service levels by “12%” in the coming year. The Ministry has allocated 300 hours of training for this purpose. Unsurprisingly, Sally-Re’s granddaughter—fresh from completing a BA in Organizational Behaviour at a community college—has already bagged the service-improvement contract, at a very good fee.

But fret not; Keith’s chairman wants to “empower middle management” and is seeking a consultant.

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Why is OD not as common an undertaking as it used to be

Both barn dancing and the Beatles are not as popular as well; for heaven’s sake, some people don’t even know who Gerry and the Pacemakers were! And who was Chuck Berry? Or Hank Snow? Them was the good old days, sang Roger Miller.

Organizational development was once widely practiced, embraced by both universities who churned out young consultants like pancakes at a breakfast dirty spoon joint; clientele included government agencies, armies, family businesses and high tech. OD became a fad, like sideburns, short skirts, fedora hats and Blackberry phones. That era is dead, מת, caduc.

Nowadays, there is less OD done than in the past. Part of the decline I have explained in another widely read post; in this post I want to focus more on factors endogenic to OD, ie, factors which are not explained away by external constraints facing the profession, but rather come from within.

  • OD is both an art and a science. Clients who want a science-based intervention and practitioner generally need the more artistic type intervention and the opposite. But clients buy what they want, not what they need. And too few OD practitioners can offer both types with the same quality of intervention.

 

  • OD is not suitable for all organizations. OD’s impact cannot be quantitatively measured, its impacts are obtuse, and other forms of change such as re-orgs, firing under-performers and coaching are more user appealing, because they have more “apparent” effectiveness. Ie, they look good, they smell good and they impress owners and board members much more than OD. For Christ’s sake, what is OD?

 

  • There are many OD professionals out there, with far more providers than clients. Very few OD professionals are on top of their game, rather there are many one trick ponies such as trainers, team builders, AI freaks, or high priests of some new religious fad sweeping the profession such as rebranding strategies for individual employees. There are also many incompetent people who have done a lot of damage by peddling damaged goods such as one -size-fits-all nonsense; see next item.

 

  • Clients that do well with OD are very unique, the exception rather than the rule: they are truly dedicated to long term sustainable albeit intangible improvement; they value effectiveness much more than the current pop star, apparent effectiveness and gloss. Commercialized OD, meaning pre-packaged so-called axiomatic nonsense, is pure gloss- as well as pure nonsense. Organizations are very complex webs of human interaction, often extremely difficult to decipher.

 

  • There are too few examples of OD projects that are hugely successful enough to serve as a positive reference point, to encourage potential clients to jump into the pool. I have been in the profession for over 45 years, and while I have an excellent track record and very satisfied clients on all continents except South America, my happy client list cannot be compared to that of a dental surgeon or plastic surgeon. Few clients are willing to share intimate details about how OD made a real difference. I had a very satisfied client (who retired) who said, “I never understood what you did until you stopped doing it (because of a downturn in his market).
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Case Study: Political Infighting

The organization is facing declining sales and profitability, and senior management has mandated significant cost reductions. Paul Wight, Head of R&D based in Denver, leads several development sites located in Brunswick (New Jersey), Vancouver (BC), Québec City, and Manchester (UK). He has been instructed to downsize his organization by 30% and close one of the sites. To discuss this plan, Paul calls all site managers to Denver.

The most controversial decision is determining which location will be closed. The head of the Manchester site, Chester Man, deeply mistrusts Paul’s judgment. Chester believes Paul dislikes the time zone challenges, the early and late hours of conference calls, and the travel burdens of flying to Manchester quarterly—in coach class. Chester suspects Paul has a hidden agenda to shut down Manchester.

Similarly, Denise Thibadeau, who leads the Québec site, assumes that her location is at risk. She believes the Québec site will be closed because of communication challenges—specifically hard to understand accents—as well as additional costs tied to compliance with Canadian language laws. Although development costs are subsidized by provincial tax concessions, Paul often shows impatience on calls when he cannot immediately understand what is being said. Denise interprets this as further evidence of bias.

In recent weeks, Denise and Chester, despite their personal animosity, have started discussing how to counter Paul’s perceived plan. They form a tactical alliance, agreeing to jointly take responsibility for maintaining a profitable legacy product and developing a new platform at exceptional speed and minimal cost. They knowingly misrepresent the timeline, assuming they can “clean it up later.” Their strategy is to leverage their sites’ low employee turnover; they escalate their proposal directly to Paul’s boss — a European — hoping to neutralize Paul’s influence.

Meanwhile, Paul asks his HR manager, Gloria Ramsbottom, to create an activity to build trust for the Denver meeting. She prepares a cooking class, followed by a webinar of a horse that runs increasingly fast while eating less.

Ultimately, Paul shuts down the Vancouver site. Denise and Chester grow their sites by 20%. Within months, Paul “moves on to his next assignment,” and Denise is selected to replace him starting in March.


Summary

This case illustrates the political dynamics and infighting within a geographically dispersed organization facing downsizing. Paul, the R&D head, must close one site and reduce staff by 30%. Site leaders in Manchester and Québec—fearing targeted closure based on assumed biases—form an unlikely alliance to protect their locations. They manipulate strategic commitments and leverage internal politics to override Paul’s authority. Despite attempts to build trust, the meeting fails to resolve underlying tensions. In the end, the Vancouver site is closed, the coalition succeeds, and Denise replaces Paul. The case highlights the challenges of mistrust, perceived favoritism, cultural differences, and coalition-building during organizational restructuring.

PS Lesson learned: People will never reach agreement who is the unlucky one to get a second circumcisions if they themselves are candidates for this procedure. Don’t use teams when you need to decide on your own.

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